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ABSTRACT 
Civil procedure, more than any other of the basic law-school 
courses, conveys to students an understanding of the whole legal 
system. I propose that this purpose should become, more openly, the 
organizing theme of the course. The focus should remain, of course, 
on the mechanics of the judicial branch. What I champion is giving 
some conscious attention, albeit mainly in the background and at an 
introductory level, to the big ideas of the constitutional structure 
within which the law formulates civil procedure. Such attention 
would unify the doctrinal study, while enriching it for the students 
and revealing its true importance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Civil procedure is a significant subject in its own right as an 
integral part of the system of justice and one that any legal 
practitioner or student, or for that matter any learned observer, must 
know to understand law. There are also many specialized reasons to 
study civil procedure and hence as many perspectives to emphasize 
in teaching it. What, then, should be the purposive theme running 
through a course in civil procedure? 
A. Championed Theme of the Civil Procedure Course 
Students will eventually restudy civil procedure when 
preparing for the bar examination. Likewise, lawyers must reapply 
themselves to civil procedure in order to become litigators. But in 
structuring a basic course, the teacher rightfully sets those aims 
aside. On the one hand, the bar examination tests details covered in 
the review courses that all students eventually take. For example, 
many bar exams test on abstention (a complex doctrine under which 
a federal court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction in deference to 
a state’s interests), while few basic courses would reach that special 
doctrine. On the other hand, most students do not become litigators, 
and those who do should acquire their knowledge and polish their 
skills much later in their apprenticeship. Yet all U.S. students take a 
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basic course in civil procedure early in their studies, so something 
else must justify that course. The first course should be about laying 
a broad but solid foundation. 
A teacher might view civil procedure as a key part of society’s 
array of dispute-resolution mechanisms, along with settlement, 
arbitration, and the like. Courts provide their procedure as a default 
set of rules, one that will govern only if some other set of procedures 
does not trump by operation of law or by choice. Because almost all 
grievances conclude without judicial adjudication, the teacher could 
justifiably view the “alternative” procedures as numerically more 
important than traditional civil procedure. Thus, the course could 
serve as a social study of dispute resolution. 
Instead, the teacher might view civil procedure as the vehicle 
for the great cases’ reshaping of society, or view it as important 
mainly in the many undeniable ways that procedure affects 
substantive law. In some senses, of course, the social impact of 
public law litigation is a more important subject for study than one 
centered on today’s ordinary court cases in private law. 
The difficulty with teachers’ attraction to these admirable law-
and-society concerns is that such emphases fail to justify civil 
procedure’s position as a “fundamental” course in law school, 
typically coming in the first year and often consuming a good 
number of credit hours. Understanding the efficiency and fairness of 
society’s whole system for dispute resolution and exploring the 
hidden impact of procedure on society’s substantive goals are both 
incredibly important, but little reason exists for starting law study 
there. Advanced courses that focus on them would be the way to go. 
The initial course should be more “basic” in theme and 
purpose, even if it should at least touch on these more advanced 
ideas. What is the appropriate purposive theme for a basic course? 
Of course, it should expose the students to the mechanics of the 
judicial branch, which is the course’s content least familiar to 
incoming students but most important when beginning law studies. 
But what is now quite obvious to me, even if I took decades to 
realize it, is that the course works mainly to orient the students in the 
structure of the whole legal system. That is the big picture for civil 
procedure! 
I want to argue that the background constitutional structure 
should be, if it is not already, the theme of the basic course in civil 
procedure. That theme will unify the doctrinal study, while enriching 
what the students take away. More than any other course, 
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“constitutionally contextualized civil procedure” can convey to 
beginning law students an understanding of their legal system: 
Civil Procedure is one of the most complicated, but most enjoyable of 
the first-year subjects, because it is your undeniable entrée into the world 
of law. In studying Civil Procedure, you learn the blueprint of the 
American legal system, and slowly discover how our entire system of civil 
justice fits together. Working through the rules to the point of mastery can 
be a long and extraordinarily frustrating process, but when the clouds 
finally do part, the elegant simplicity of the system of American civil 
procedure will be yours to keep.1 
It is in this principal sense that civil procedure serves the rest of the 
law school’s curriculum. And it is this focus on structure that makes 
civil procedure one of the most central of legal subjects in American 
academia—while in Europe, where civil procedure encompasses just 
the mechanics, it is considered an inferior academic subject, with the 
course sometimes relegated to a post-graduate practice program. 
B. Sense of the Constitutional Structure  
Okay, so what is this structure that the course should aim at 
exposing? It is the constitutional structure within which the law 
constructs its civil procedure. The constitutional space occupied by 
the architecture of civil procedure rests on a foundation of the extant 
constitutional powers. But the permissible bounds of the space—the 
compound’s floor, outer walls, and roof—emerge from the limits 
imposed by the Constitution. The architect has a lot of freedom in 
designing civil procedure within that space, but must use the existing 
powers strictly within those imposed limits. As the teacher and 
students explore and dissect the architecture of civil procedure in this 
particular course, they come to comprehend more generally how the 
rest of the legal system operates within the constitutional structure. 
The laws of torts, contracts, property, and crime all work the same 
way, but the key ideas converge and emerge in the course on civil 
procedure. 
Now, I am not talking about constitutional doctrines that 
directly form part of civil procedure, such as the Seventh 
Amendment’s preservation of a civil jury right for federal courts. In 
fact, civil procedure, unlike criminal or even administrative 
procedure, does not contain much constitutional law of this kind in 
                                                     
 1. ROBERT H. MILLER, LAW SCHOOL CONFIDENTIAL 141 (3d ed. 2011). 
 Civil Procedure’s Five Big Ideas 59 
its foreground.2 Instead, what I am talking about is the Constitution’s 
structural role, played more in the background. 
Above all, I am not suggesting that civil procedure should be a 
wannabe course in Constitutional Law or a stunted course on Federal 
Courts. The course’s concern should be more structural than rights-
based. It should be more focused on the political science aspects of 
government generally and less focused on federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction. In any event, the subject of the course remains civil 
procedure. We are studying procedure, and these themes of 
constitutional structure should remain very much in the background 
and at an introductory level. The aim is merely constitutional 
contextualization. Still, this contextualized study of procedure will 
help crystallize the students’ vague pre-existing knowledge of 
governmental structure, and a small amount of attention given to 
constitutional concerns will in turn illuminate the understanding of 
procedure and reveal its true importance. 
Procedural due process might serve as an illustration of the 
constitutional structure that underlies civil procedure. This doctrine, 
like equal protection, concerns how the government must act rather 
than what it can or cannot do, which the other structural doctrines 
treat. The Due Process Clauses dictate the minimally fair process that 
the government must provide when impairing a person’s property or 
liberty interest. They require no more than a minimum. “To say that 
a law does not violate the due process clause, is to say the least 
possible good about it.”3 So due process establishes only the floor, 
above which procedural law frames our living space. The lawmaking 
architects build a law of civil procedure that delivers much more 
“good” than mere due process. They seek thereby to achieve optimal 
policies and rules, within all constitutional limits. 
C. Doctrinal Framework of the Course  
As for the rest of the constitutional structure, I shall explain one 
part of it in a separate section of this Article on each of the doctrinal 
                                                     
 2. See John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
579, 579 (1984) (“Yet civil procedure—as important as [criminal or administrative 
procedure] and surely no model of perfection—has remained relatively untouched 
[by the Constitution], even if the Court does occasionally gnaw the familiar bone of 
personal jurisdiction doctrine.”). 
 3. Elliott E. Cheatham, Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and Some 
Questions, 25 ARK. L. REV. 9, 25 (1971). 
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forays made during the typical course.4 Most courses try to break 
down the subject of civil procedure along the lines of an overview or 
survey followed by a close inspection of certain major procedural 
problems. The latter often includes these four: governing law, 
authority to adjudicate, former adjudication, and complex litigation. 
Such a selection of problems appropriately aims at informing 
students about the legal system under which they live and in which 
they are beginning their study of law: one in which the federal and 
state relation is key; one in which allocation of authority among the 
states is key; one in which the separation of powers between the 
judiciary and other branches is key; and one in which the capacity of 
the judiciary to adapt in handling new kinds of cases is key. 
Selection of these four problems is all the more appropriate because 
today they arise in an increasingly complex and globalized setting, 
and so they remain fresh and important. 
 
 The overview of the stages of litigation introduces civil 
procedure by tracing the six steps from commencing a lawsuit 
in some trial court to completing the final appeal in the highest 
available appellate court: forum selection, pretrial practice, 
settlement process, trial practice, judgment entry, and appeal 
practice. These mechanics of litigation appear to the untutored 
as the totality of procedure, but in fact many proceduralists and 
many procedure courses are mainly devoted instead to the four 
major problems lurking around these mechanics. Nevertheless, 
surveying the mechanics at the outset serves to construct a 
framework for the subject of civil procedure. 
 The topic of governing law examines a question that pervades 
the overview and deserves systematic treatment: When should 
a court choose to apply the law of some sovereign other than its 
own? This poses problems of interstate and international choice 
of law and also problems involving the Erie5 doctrine that 
concerns the choice between federal and state law. 
 The topic of authority to adjudicate treats a major problem of 
civil procedure that arises at the start of the overview. There, it 
was probably assumed that the plaintiff had properly selected a 
court with authority to adjudicate. In fact, that preliminary step 
can be a most difficult and significant one. It involves 
satisfying three threshold requirements: subject-matter 
                                                     
 4. See infra Parts I-V. 
 5. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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jurisdiction, territorial authority to adjudicate, and notice. 
Moreover, these requirements entail consideration of such 
subsumed matters as state and federal court systems, territorial 
jurisdiction, venue, and service of process. 
 The topic of former adjudication studies a question that arises 
at the end of the overview: What impact does a previously 
rendered adjudication have in subsequent litigation? This 
question primarily entails problems of res judicata, a doctrine 
that pursues finality in its specification of the effects to be 
given a judgment, the judicial branch’s end-product. 
 The topic of complex litigation investigates the restrictions 
concerning which claims and parties the litigants must or may 
join in their lawsuit. In the opening overview or survey, it was 
generally assumed that a single plaintiff was suing a single 
defendant on a single claim. In practice, much more complex 
multiclaim and multiparty lawsuits enjoy ever-increasing 
frequency and importance. 
D. Integration of Constitutional Structure with Doctrinal Framework 
Each Part of this Article will deliver the “Big Idea” behind the 
particular topic. I shall set out the constitutional doctrine that I try to 
convey in essence to my students, along with a few representative 
applications to civil procedure. I am using the phrase of “Big Idea” 
not in the sense of a revolutionary insight,6 but rather in the sense of 
an important concept that can serve an organizational purpose. 
Naturally, the course’s big ideas are interrelated and 
overlapping. Each topic’s big idea, while self-contained, will 
accordingly lead into the next topic’s big idea. Thus, this Article will 
progress through the relations among the branches of government, 
the relations between the federal and state sovereigns, and the 
relations of state to state—whereby an image of the Constitution will 
emerge as a joint-venture contract among thirteen independent state 
sovereigns to create a federal government of limited and separated 
powers, with special prominence in the contract given to its choice-
of-law and choice-of-forum “clauses.” This Article will then 
complete its progress through the big ideas by turning, in particular, 
to how the output of the judicial branch in the form of nationwide-
                                                     
 6. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982).  
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respected judgments determines that branch’s distinctive nature—
and finally by returning to consideration of how courts perform their 
function by more than a minimally fair process. Let me here preview 
the journey. 
The beginning of any civil procedure course traces the stages of 
litigation. To govern those stages, the lawmakers seek optimal 
procedures, acting in response to the felt needs for dispute resolution 
and also in pursuit of society’s outcome and process values. The 
emergence of statutory authorization for judicial rulemaking shows 
that the procedural lawmakers’ key first step is to resolve the proper 
roles of the legislature and the judiciary. For example, study of 
federal procedure will inevitably involve a consideration of the 
proper interplay of Congress and the courts, which takes place on the 
constitutional terrain of separation of powers. 
Next, I move to governing law. The Framers had concerns 
about interstate choice of law. But over time, the more critical 
question has emerged as to what they had to say about the choice of 
law between federal and state regimes. The choice-of-law “clause” 
of the constitutional contract is in fact so prominent that it becomes 
useful to view the Constitution centrally as a choice-of-law 
agreement, with the states here giving such-and-such to the federal 
government but retaining this-and-that for state law, and so on 
through the document. The Constitution’s preoccupation with the 
relation between federal and state law, as well as the subsequent 
development of all the subconstitutional law on the subject, justifies 
treating as a big idea the subject of vertical federalism.  
The prior attention to interstate, or horizontal, choice of law 
smooths the transition to authority to adjudicate. Although attention 
is owing to federal/state and even international divisions of authority, 
the centerpiece here is allocation of authority among the states. 
When can New York handle matters of considerable concern to New 
Jersey? The big idea accordingly shifts to the Constitution’s structure 
for territorial jurisdiction, built in the United States on the notion of 
horizontal federalism. 
The next topic of former adjudication enmeshes the students in 
the essence of the judicial branch. Res judicata is the doctrine that 
defines a judgment, which is the output of the judicial branch. By its 
definition, a judgment decides certain things and does not decide 
other things. The court acts against only the parties before it and a 
very limited set of others. This feature gives the judicial branch its 
distinctive nature. By contrast, where a court has authority to speak, 
it speaks with real authority. And that authority is, at the least, 
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nationwide. That is, we enjoy the benefits of a legally unified nation 
thanks to the notion of full faith and credit. 
Finally, the topic of complex litigation starts to come back to 
“procedure” in its strict sense. The big idea here is using the 
justification of adequate representation to extend the binding effects 
of a judgment to more nonparties. Procedural law puts severe limits 
on such extension, constructing a roof on its structure, because 
society wants to preserve the distinctive nature of adjudication.7 
Moreover, the Constitution puts an absolute limit on how far law can 
extend the binding effects.8 To perceive that outer limit, the focus 
must return to procedural due process.9 
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
A course’s overview traces the stages of litigation. Such an 
overview of federal procedure will inevitably involve a consideration 
of the proper interplay of Congress and the federal courts. That 
interplay takes place on the constitutional terrain of separation of 
powers.10 
A. Constitutional Doctrine 
Separation of powers was the Framers’ great horizontal theme 
for the federal government. By contrast, federalism built the vertical 
relationship between the new federal government and the existing 
state sovereigns. For the separation theme, the Framers mainly drew 
on John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1690) and 
                                                     
 7. See infra Section V.B. 
 8. See infra Section V.A; see also Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata as 
Requisite for Justice, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 18-
19), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2614433. 
 9. Another attempt to distill the big ideas of the course lies in SUZANNA 
SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE: ESSENTIALS (2007). This book is a 
novel contribution among the recent onslaught of study aids, in that it conveys the 
desired end-product of the course rather than a mini-treatise on the law. Its synthesis 
comprises a distillation of the seven great themes that the authors think should 
underlie a course in civil procedure: adversary system, jury trial, accuracy, 
procedural fairness, efficiency, transactionalism, and federalism. I think this is a 
good list of the ideas that would emerge from studying procedure as procedure. 
Although my list overlaps theirs, mine is more externally imposed than internally 
propagated, in that I offer my five ideas as a means to build a fruitful framework for 
teaching the basic course in civil procedure. 
 10. See generally SEPARATION OF POWERS: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 
(Katy J. Harriger ed., 2003). 
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especially Baron de Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws (1748) in 
implementing their theory of three offsetting branches of 
government, a theory previously pioneered by the states and 
subsequently elaborated by James Madison in The Federalist (1788). 
The Constitution does not explicitly invoke the theory, but the theory 
pervades the document’s construction. The most obvious 
manifestation appears in its devoting Article I to the legislature, 
Article II to the executive, and Article III to the judiciary. The 
Framers’ motivating idea was that separation would result not only 
in better (less arbitrary) law, but also in less law overall, than if 
power were concentrated. 
The Constitution was far from definitive or complete on the 
details of the subject, however. How, then, to read the Constitution? 
Although the Framers’ construction of the three separate Articles 
suggested a formalist notion of separate spheres of authority for the 
three branches, the functionalist reality has meant partially 
overlapping spheres. The case law on separation of powers has 
therefore turned out rather spongy. Actual applications of the 
doctrine depend heavily on context and time. The cases’ approach 
seems to allow shared power unless a branch’s core function is 
endangered or unless the Constitution’s text specifically committed 
the particular task to one branch. 
Over the course of history, the big confrontations over 
separation of powers have arisen between the executive and the 
legislature.11 In the field of civil procedure, however, the interest lies 
more with contests between the legislature and the judiciary. So let 
us focus on the relevant text in that latter regard. 
The separateness is exemplified by the main provisions. 
Article I, § 1 of the Federal Constitution provides: 
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.12 
Article III, § 1 provides: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, 
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, 
                                                     
 11. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 
(1952) (invalidating President Truman’s wartime seizure of the nation’s major steel 
mills). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  
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receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office.13 
That last sentence giving federal judges life tenure is indicative of 
the general directive that each branch should stay out of another 
branch’s business. Symmetrical provisions lie in such clauses as 
Article I, § 5 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with 
the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”)14 and Article I, § 6 
(“and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be 
questioned in any other Place”).15 
The overlap of the branches’ business, however, shows up in 
Article I, § 8: 
The Congress shall have Power . . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to the 
supreme Court; . . . —And To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.16 
So, the Constitution gives Congress the power to create lower federal 
courts, thus implicitly giving it plenty of authority to dictate their 
jurisdiction. Moreover, Article III, § 2, after laying out the categories 
of cases and controversies beyond which Congress cannot extend the 
federal courts’ “judicial power,” provides specifically as to the 
United States Supreme Court: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have 
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme 
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.17 
All that provides quite an overlap between branches. The resulting 
tensions, which were intended to energize separation of powers, 
nicely emerge by a closer look at this realm of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
First, it is true that courts exercise power throughout their 
jurisdiction. But, except for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, the granting of jurisdiction is a legislative function. The courts 
                                                     
 13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.  
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.  
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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have generally respected that assignment to Congress18—even if the 
Court has approved occasional wanderings, most notably in its 
approval of judge-created pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in the 
period before Congress recaptured the area by its 1990 statute 
bestowing supplemental jurisdiction.19 
The scheme, then, is clear: Most federal-court jurisdiction does 
not exist until Congress bestows it. Article III’s sketching of the 
“judicial power” represents only an outer limit on congressional 
power, not a grant of power itself. Congress has exercised its 
Article I power through a whole series of jurisdictional statutes. 
However, out of congressional concern for maintaining a healthy 
federalism, these statutes fall far short of bestowing all of the federal 
judicial power under the Constitution. Thus, when considering an 
issue of federal jurisdiction, one must refer first to the congressional 
enactment on jurisdiction and then to the constitutional limit on the 
judicial power; for such jurisdiction to exist, the particular case 
generally must fall within the bounds of both. 
The Constitution gives Congress a fairly free hand in 
withholding or withdrawing from the lower federal courts original 
jurisdiction over the enumerated “cases” and “controversies” within 
the federal judicial power.20 Similarly, Articles I and III appear to 
confide the appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts largely to 
congressional control. Are there any limits on the jurisdiction-
stripping that Congress can inflict on the federal courts? Imagine that 
Congress tried to keep school-prayer cases and appeals out of those 
courts henceforth. Congress has not attempted much like that, so the 
law is uncertain, although potentially of great political import. In 
fact, some constitutional limitations seem to exist, based on notions 
of preserving the courts’ essential functions under the Constitution or 
observing specific rights recognized elsewhere in the Constitution, 
but those limitations are surely vague and fairly slight.21 
                                                     
 18. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 4 (1825) 
(holding that Congress has authority to regulate the mode of executing on 
judgments). 
 19. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); see also Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without 
Politics—A Half Measure of Authority for Jurisdictional Common Law, 1991 BYU 
L. REV. 767, 767-78.  
 20. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 518 (1869) 
(upholding a congressional statute repealing a portion of habeas corpus jurisdiction). 
 21. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (overturning a 
congressional statute suspending a portion of habeas corpus jurisdiction). See 
generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.2, at 186 (discussing 
congressional control of Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction), § 3.3, at 200 
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Second, moving from this example of exclusive legislative 
authority, we pass over the difficult question of the extent to which 
Congress can give Article III functions to bodies outside the judicial 
branch,22 and we pause on the converse question of whether 
Congress can authorize the courts to exercise some of the legislative 
power by delegation. As an example, Congress established the 
United States Sentencing Commission to issue guidelines for 
criminal sentences. Three of the seven commissioners were to be 
sitting federal judges, thus mingling the branches. The Court held 
that the legislature could delegate, and the judiciary could accept, 
such nonadjudicatory functions of rulemaking “that do not trench 
upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to 
the central mission of the Judiciary.”23 
Third, to complete the spectrum of governmental power 
possessed by the legislature and the judiciary, there is some core of 
exclusive judicial authority out of which the legislature must stay. 
The example here is a congressional statute that required federal 
courts to reopen final judgments already rendered in certain 
securities actions, namely, ones dismissed under the statute of 
limitations after the Supreme Court had abruptly changed the 
limitations law. The Court ruled that this command violated 
separation of powers: 
Article III establishes a “judicial department” with the “province and duty 
. . . to say what the law is” in particular cases and controversies. The 
record of history shows that the Framers crafted this charter of the judicial 
department with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal 
Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, 
subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy . . . . 
By retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, 
Congress has violated this fundamental principle.24 
                                                                                                                
(discussing congressional control of lower federal courts’ jurisdiction) (6th ed. 
2012); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10, 
at 41 (7th ed. 2011). 
 22. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011) (holding that non-
Article III bankruptcy judge could not hear a tort counterclaim brought by Anna 
Nicole Smith); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, § 11, at 48. 
 23. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388 (1989). 
 24. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see 
Dustin B. Benham, Beyond Congress’s Reach: Constitutional Aspects of Inherent 
Power, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 75, 77, 82 (2013); Jeffrey A. Parness, State Damage 
Caps and Separation of Powers, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 145, 145-46 (2011). 
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How has the separation-of-powers idea worked out? 
Competition among the branches in the overlaps helps to ensure 
adequate checks and balances, and hence a more optimal division of 
labor that has made government more effective. The doctrine has 
also worked to limit government, but perhaps not as much as the 
Framers hoped because of the many unforeseen changes over time, 
such as the rise of administrative agencies and the modern 
prevalence of party politics. 
B. Application to Stages of Litigation 
1. Spectrum of Power for Procedural Lawmaking 
To govern the stages of litigation, the lawmakers seek to 
develop optimal procedures. Most of the resulting law of procedure 
lies outside the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, principally 
generated by legislatures as statutes or by courts in the course of 
ordinary decisionmaking, as well as by judicial exercise of the 
various authorizations to issue court rules. 
The history of procedure shows that the lawmakers’ key first 
step is to resolve the proper roles of the legislature and the 
judiciary.25 Much turns on who in theory can do a better job and even 
more so on whom experience has shown to have done better. 
Legislatures and courts are certainly not equivalent lawmakers. 
Legislatures are often thought of as lawmakers par excellence 
in modern societies. They embody the voice of the demos, 
constituting the supreme lawmaker within constitutional limits but 
answering to the people. And they are well equipped to make certain 
kinds of law. First, unlike courts as we traditionally know them, a 
legislature can set up committees and commissions to investigate 
social problems in depth and in breadth, preparatory to making law. 
Second, a legislature can act on its own initiative, and it can deal 
with more aspects of a social problem at one time than can a court. 
Third, when a court does act definitively, this will usually have a 
retroactive effect, whereas a legislature may better secure fairness by 
acting prospectively. Fourth, in general a court’s decision coercively 
binds only the parties, whereas a legislature can speak directly to the 
populace as a whole. Fifth, what a court decides to do about a social 
                                                     
 25. See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan & Warren J. Greene, The Legislature’s 
Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. 
L. REV. 234, 235 (1952). 
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problem might be buried in a mass of arcane law reports, whereas a 
legislature can adopt methods of promulgation and publicity better 
designed to get the word around and thus to allow the citizenry to 
conform their conduct. Sixth, courts do not have all the methods and 
remedies for dealing with a social problem that legislatures have, 
including the funding of a solution. Seventh, legislatures can act 
without the restrictions of the theoretical expectations we 
traditionally impose on courts, such as drawing only principled 
distinctions and not working obviously major social changes. 
Yet, as makers of certain other kinds of law, courts have 
important advantages over legislatures. First, impartially applying 
law to new situations is a task that legislators are distinctly unsuited 
to perform. Second, generating interstitial law usually cannot await 
the possibility of the legislature returning to the subject. Third, even 
as a wholly original matter, if neither legislature nor court has had 
much prior experience with a social problem, letting the courts 
wrestle with the problem on a case-by-case basis may be best, testing 
general propositions against the reality of concrete situations. Fourth, 
courts may be better suited to originate law that turns on many 
factors or on common sense solutions framed in terms of familiar, 
everyday moral concepts such as blame. Fifth, if the courts have 
done much of the original work in developing an area of the law, 
allowing them to continue the evolutionary task of clarifying and 
reshaping that law may be preferable. Sixth, when the issue is not 
one on which political parties divide, there is less reason for insisting 
that it be resolved in the first instance by a legislative body. Seventh, 
the issue may instead be one that has become a political hot potato 
within the gridlocked legislative body, but clearly ought not to be left 
that way, or one as to which the majoritarian process of legislatures 
would fail to protect the interests of certain small groups within 
society. 
An alternative answer to this legislature-versus-court problem 
is the administrative body empowered to make governing regulations 
and decisions within a basic framework hewn by the legislature. In 
returning from the foregoing very general political-science 
considerations to the context of making procedural law, the analogy 
to administrative lawmaking lies in the modern emergence of 
statutory authorization for judicial rulemaking.26 
                                                     
 26. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2(C)(2), 
at 38-56 (4th ed. 2015). 
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All this discussion really concerns the notion of division of 
labor, however. To get back to separation of powers, one should ask 
not who would do the job better, but who must do certain jobs by 
constitutional requirement. The separation of powers as to procedural 
lawmaking falls on the same tripartite spectrum that runs from 
exclusive legislative power through delegated power to exclusive 
court power. 
The resultant pattern of procedure for the federal system is as 
follows: (1) The legislature has very broad power to regulate the 
courts’ civil procedure (e.g., Federal Rules of Evidence, which was 
enacted as a statute by Congress). Although the courts themselves 
have overlapping power to regulate their own civil procedure by 
lawmaking, either by judicial decision or by court rulemaking, they 
act at the sufferance of and subject to the ultimate control of the 
legislature (e.g., res judicata),27 and they must stay out of certain 
areas (e.g., subject-matter jurisdiction).28 (2) The courts also have 
power to regulate their own civil procedure by rulemaking pursuant 
to a proper delegation of legislative power (e.g., Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which was promulgated by the Supreme Court 
under the Rules Enabling Act).29 (3) Finally, the courts have power to 
regulate their own civil procedure by lawmaking within a narrow 
inherent judicial power to conduct the courts’ own business (e.g., 
discipline of individual attorneys for misconduct before the courts).30 
2. Outer Bounds for Legislature and Judiciary 
The legislature cannot act in derogation of the judiciary’s 
inherent power. Nor can it act otherwise in violation of the 
Constitution. The limitation brings to mind the most obvious of 
controls on the legislative branch, that being judicial review. Courts 
                                                     
 27. See Kaplan & Greene, supra note 25, at 244-54 (arguing that the 
legislature has authority to override court-promulgated rules by statute, as a check 
on the judiciary). 
 28. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21. 
 29. See Michael Blasie, Note, A Separation of Powers Defense of Federal 
Rulemaking Power, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 593, 593-95 (2011). 
 30. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding 
the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 84-89; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The 
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 
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usually can strike down legislation that transgresses constitutional 
limits.31 
A symmetrical control on the judiciary is Article III’s 
restriction of courts’ activity to “case or controversy.”32 This 
justiciability restriction comes up in connection with the limited 
authorization of declaratory judgments, which one studies against the 
backdrop of the constitutional requirement of ripeness and 
prohibition of advisory opinions. The motive behind the 
Constitution’s telling courts to stay away from abstract questions is 
both to improve the judicial function and to protect the states and the 
other federal branches from intrusion. First, courts as we know them 
will perform better if they decide based on focused facts presented 
by interested adversaries; moreover, permitting only concrete 
disputes will keep many actions out of court, so allowing courts to 
handle their business more effectively. Second, the justiciability 
limitation keeps courts out of aggressive and prospective lawmaking, 
which is not the assigned task of the judiciary. In any event, 
justiciability has generated an immense body of law, which clusters 
under the additional doctrines of standing, mootness, and political 
questions.  
Standing doctrine comprises a complicated mass of law, which 
nevertheless does important work in restraining the courts to stay 
within the judicial realm of adjudicating individualized disputes. 
Constitutional standing requires that the plaintiff complain of a 
personalized and direct injury in fact.33 Courts have, also, some 
discretion to decline jurisdiction when the plaintiff is poorly 
positioned to present the action, as when the plaintiff is primarily 
asserting the rights of others.34 This so-called prudential overlay goes 
beyond the requirements of Article III, but helps to ensure that the 
judiciary does not too actively oversee the executive function. 
Mootness doctrine is a little more self-evident in meaning, 
although drawing the line still proves difficult in practice. It provides 
that there is no case or controversy once the dispute has been 
resolved. This is the other side of the ripeness doctrine and rests on 
the same reasons of fostering the judicial function and insulating the 
                                                     
 31. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138-39 (1803) 
(invalidating a congressional statute granting jurisdiction beyond constitutional 
bounds). 
 32. See generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, §§ 12-15, at 61-95.  
 33. See id. § 13, at 68-85. 
 34. See id. 
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legislative function. Similarly, parties cannot collude to produce a 
dispute. 
Finally, the political question doctrine most nicely stands as a 
counterpoint to judicial review. It holds that certain matters are so 
enmeshed in the other branches’ concerns that a court will not review 
their acts to test for constitutionality. This does not mean that the acts 
are not subject to the Constitution, but only that the duties of 
interpreting and implementing the Constitution lie with the political 
branches. The leading case defined the scope of the political question 
doctrine in these terms: 
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to 
the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, 
although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a 
function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case 
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the 
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.35 
II. VERTICAL FEDERALISM 
I now move on to governing law. The Constitution’s 
preoccupation with the relation between federal and state law, as 
well as the subsequent development of all the subconstitutional law 
on the subject, justifies treating as a big idea the subject of 
federalism.36 
A. Constitutional Doctrine 
While separation of powers was the Framers’ great horizontal 
theme for the federal government, they hit upon federalism to build 
the vertical relationship between the new federal government and the 
existing state sovereigns. For the theory of federalism, they drew on 
various political experiments in the governance of the British 
                                                     
 35. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (establishing equal voting 
rights, after the Court ruled that the political question doctrine did not apply). 
 36. See generally ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR., FEDERALISM (2011). 
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Empire. But their Constitution was the first attempt to institutionalize 
this system of government. “The Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty.”37 
The definition of federalism is a governmental system by 
which its people live under the authority of more than one sovereign. 
To create such a system, there must be some zone of constitutionally 
entrenched decentralized power, where the constitutive sovereign 
can act without being subject to the central sovereign’s override. 
That zone is what permits us to speak of there being more than one 
sovereign. 
Distinguish the system of unitary government, adopted in 
countries like France or England. There, people lived under a single 
sovereign. Such a central authority might be partially decentralized 
so that certain powers are exercised by local authorities. But those 
local authorities are under the dictate of the central, unitary authority. 
Indeed, such decentralization is often a sound idea. It can deliver 
many of the advantages often associated with federalism—like 
localized governmental responsiveness, increased citizen 
involvement, and policy experimentation and competition.38 That 
possibility of reaping advantages by decentralization raises the 
question of why the Framers instead went the federalism route. 
First, federalism was their solution for meeting the states’ 
sovereignty demands and for reconciling multiple political identities. 
The states would not agree to a union without a compromise to 
ensure their continued existence. Citizens strongly identified with 
their states, probably more so than with the new nation. Today, 
seriously divided identity may no longer prevail, but its resolution 
was an original aim of federalism. 
Second, another big aim of the Framers was to limit the powers 
of the federal government being created. Recall that their belief was 
that divided authority would result not only in better law, but also in 
less law, than if powers were concentrated. So, federalism was to 
work in tandem with separation of powers to restrain the federal 
government.  
Third, at the same time, the Framers wanted to ensure that the 
federal government had enough power to avoid the paralyzing 
problems of an overly weak central government. The Constitution 
                                                     
 37. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 38. Cf. Jonathan Rodden, Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: 
On Meaning and Measurement, 36 COMP. POL. 481, 482 (2004) (questioning both). 
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was the attempt to cure the shortcomings experienced under the 
Articles of Confederation. The new regime provided a federal 
government that was supreme in its limited sphere. 
Obviously, then, federalism was born of tension to live a life of 
tension. Under such a system, the question will always exist as to 
whether the state should be left to govern a certain matter or whether 
the federal government could assert itself on the matter. In fact, the 
unresolvable tension sometimes leaves both conservatives and 
liberals at sea, when their views on states’ rights come into conflict 
with their policy preferences regarding the matter. 
So, how to read the Constitution? Theory evokes a notion of 
separate spheres of authority for the two levels, but again the reality 
is partially overlapping spheres.39 The appropriate realms are 
observed through a variety of techniques, comprising not only 
judicially enforced prohibitions, but also political pressures 
protecting state interests. Indeed, federalism is largely enforced by 
Congress, where states are ensured representation, including equal 
representation in the Senate. Also, the various speed bumps in the 
process for making laws have a braking effect on hegemony. 
Furthermore, even in the absence of compulsion or impediment, the 
creation of subconstitutional federal law that defers to state interests 
and the enactment of state law that asserts state interests help to keep 
federalism alive and well.40 
Courts do have a role in policing the legislatures, but perform it 
in largely ineffectual ways. For example, courts in theory limit 
Congress to the spheres of enumerated powers in Article I. However, 
over time the Supreme Court has loosely interpreted those powers, 
while giving full play to the authorization to Congress to “make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution” the enumerated powers.41 It has read “necessary” to mean 
convenient rather than indispensable.42 Thus, Congress can use any 
reasonable means to effectuate an enumerated power, with 
“reasonable” implying a balancing test that asks if a proper federal 
                                                     
 39. See Ernest A. Young, What Does It Take to Make a Federal System? 
On Constitutional Entrenchment, Separate Spheres, and Identity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 
831, 831-32 (2010) (book review). 
 40. See Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 
1996-97 (2014); Garrick B. Pursley, Defeasible Federalism, 63 ALA. L. REV. 801, 
802-03 (2012). 
 41. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES § 3.2, at 246 (5th ed. 2015) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 42. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411-25 (1819). 
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interest is wildly outweighed by state interests.43 The effect, or lack 
of effect, of judicial policing is seen best in the incredible growth of 
Congress’s commerce power over the course of the nation’s history.44 
In search of an alternative way to police Congress, the Court 
has established some limits on the ways that Congress in exercising 
its wide powers can impinge on state sovereignty. By the anti-
commandeering doctrine, the Court says that Congress cannot 
directly make the state executive or legislature perform 
governmental acts.45 An analogous kind of limitation is state 
sovereign immunity, which forbids private suits for money damages 
against states.46 
The Tenth Amendment, acting more as a summary of 
constitutional structure than as an independent limitation, puts it this 
way: 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.47 
On the other side of the federalism equation—ensuring the 
federal government adequate powers by restricting state powers—
there is actual operative constitutional text to consult. It lies in the 
all-important Supremacy Clause of Article VI: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.48 
Accordingly, if Congress passes a statute within its powers, it will 
preempt any state law that directly collides with the statute. 
Finally, how has the federalism idea worked out? The problem 
of dueling dual political identities has receded for modern 
Americans. The doctrine has worked to limit government, although 
perhaps not as much as the Framers hoped. It certainly has not 
worked to prevent a great rise of the federal authority. But there is 
also no denying that a very real existence of both state and federal 
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governments, along with many resulting tensions, has persisted for 
over two centuries. So, federalism has worked out okay. 
While the advantages of federalism may be only arguable, it 
surely seems terribly complicated, in a way so typical of American 
law. However, there is nothing peculiarly American here. Federalism 
is today a common form of political organization around the world, 
with Canada and Germany being ready examples (as well as the 
European Union itself).49 Some of those regimes make federalism 
somewhat less complicated, as by having only one hierarchy of 
courts. But other of federalism’s complications are unavoidable. In 
particular, because federalism involves the people living under the 
authority of more than one sovereign, the problem of choosing 
between state and federal law is inevitably ubiquitous in any form of 
federalism.50 
B. Application to Governing Law 
1. Limitation on Federal Power 
Federalism concerns underlie every legal question that arises in 
this country. We can see this best in connection with the topic of 
governing law. In particular, we can ask what the limits are on the 
federal government in choosing to govern a matter by federal law.51 
As an introductory example, think of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), 
which Congress enacted in 1990: 
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under [supplemental 
jurisdiction] . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period 
of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer 
tolling period.52 
Congress thus enlarged the period that a state-law claim could be 
brought in state court after the claim’s dismissal from federal court. 
Did the Constitution permit Congress so to affect the conduct of 
litigation in state court? Yes, according to a unanimous Supreme 
                                                     
 49. See RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 5 (3d ed. 2008) 
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 50. See Kevin M. Clermont, Book Review, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 258, 260 
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Court.53 Congress has broad powers from Articles I and III to create 
and regulate federal courts. The Necessary and Proper Clause 
effectively broadens them further. This collateral regulation of state 
courts was “necessary” because it was conducive to the 
administration of justice and plainly adapted to that end. By 
§ 1367(d), Congress was pursuing federal interests of (1) 
discouraging plaintiffs from seeking insurance by double filing in 
both federal and state court and (2) discouraging defendants from 
wastefully and unfairly delaying an objection to jurisdiction, while 
(3) not discouraging resort to federal courts by litigants who would 
otherwise fear a fatal failure to establish jurisdiction and (4) not 
discouraging federal judges from dismissing cases better suited for 
state court. Those interests were not outweighed by state interests 
because the strong one of providing repose from stale claims suffers 
little impingement, given that the federal suit still had to have been 
filed within the state’s limitations period. 
Congress likewise could legislate on many other matters that 
arise in the civil procedure course. It could, for example, pass a 
statute to reform the territorial jurisdiction of state courts. It could 
found this initiative on the Due Process Clause, the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, or the Commerce Clause, while buttressing its effort 
to cover state courts’ international litigation by reference to 
congressional powers over foreign relations.54 I believe that 
congressional reform of the states’ territorial jurisdiction would be a 
good idea. However, Congress has shown next to no inclination to do 
anything of the kind. 
If Congress were to show such an inclination, there would be 
some limits. For example, consider congressional authority to 
legislate on the operation of state courts in handling state-law cases. 
Congress would face no problem in regulating procedure for federal-
law claims brought in state court, but it would really be stretching to 
enact a procedural code for all actions in state court. Wholesale 
displacement of state procedure by Congress would be 
constitutionally troubling.55 Naturally, constitutional limits on the 
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other branches of the federal government would be the same or, in all 
theoretical likelihood, more restrictive.56 
2. Limitation on State Power 
In contrast to the wide ineffectiveness of the formal limitations 
on federal power, the Supremacy Clause would appear to make the 
limitations on the states’ power extremely effective. The doctrine of 
preemption guarantees as much. Congress could often knock the 
states out of the picture. 
Yet, surprisingly, federalism has kept the federal government 
from capitalizing on the states’ theoretical weakness. Today, states 
have a broad range of power, and their laws govern much of our 
lives. In many regulatory areas, a mixture of state and federal law 
governs. Federalism apparently works because the sovereigns want 
to make it work, rather than their being compelled to make it work.57 
The best examples lie in the operation of the Erie doctrine. 
Although Congress could make federal law into the governing law 
for most situations, it has not. Political and process restraints, as well 
as good or at least accepted policy, have worked to protect state 
interests. In the absence of such a congressional command, the courts 
have chosen to defer to state law—more broadly in state courts under 
the judicial approach to preemption and reverse-Erie, and even more 
broadly in federal courts, than they have to.58 
This reality of practice, which reveals deference against the 
background of lenient constitutional command, makes Erie the ideal 
topic for studying vertical federalism in action. 
III. HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM 
As we reach the middle of this Article’s five “big ideas,” I 
should emphasize that each of the big ideas shows up in connection 
with every topic. That is why they are big ideas. In the topic of 
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authority to adjudicate, the pervasiveness became obvious. The 
initial subtopic of subject-matter jurisdiction turns on both (1) 
separation of powers and (2) vertical federalism, the former 
predominant in the existence of legislative power to bestow 
jurisdiction on the federal courts and the latter predominant in the 
extent to which Congress has acted to bestow federal jurisdiction at 
the expense of state courts. The central subtopic of territorial 
authority to adjudicate pulls in (4) full faith and credit. The final 
subtopic of notice clearly entails the study of (5) procedural due 
process. 
But this topic’s biggest idea arises in connection with the 
horizontal allocation of territorial adjudicatory authority among the 
state sovereigns. When can New York handle matters of 
considerable concern to New Jersey? The big-idea focus accordingly 
shifts to the Constitution’s structure for territorial jurisdiction, built 
in the United States on the notion of (3) horizontal federalism.59 
A. Constitutional Doctrine 
Both vertical federalism and horizontal federalism were 
necessary ingredients for thirteen nation-states to get together and 
form a union. They needed not only to establish the new federal 
government of separated and limited powers coexisting with state 
powers, but also to regulate the horizontal relations among the states. 
Interstate relations had not prospered under the Articles of 
Confederation. Each state came into the Constitutional Convention 
intent on keeping the other states from inflicting more harm.  
Yet the Constitution would treat the states as equals, imposing 
no explicit priority rule analogous to the Supremacy Clause’s role in 
vertical federalism that would resolve conflicting states’ actions.60 
Therefore, the colliding powers of multiple equals would foreseeably 
produce deleterious effects, with each state impinging on other states 
and their citizens. Horizontal federalism was the expression of the 
Framers’ attempt to help the states to live together.  
Horizontal federalism therefore differs in aim from vertical 
federalism. It has worked well, if one overlooks the Civil War. The 
years have seen a marked decrease in the psychological and legal 
significance of state borders.  
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Another difference between horizontal and vertical federalism 
is that the constitutional mechanisms for controlling colliding state 
powers generally work more by prohibition than by cooperation.61 
But cooperation is not totally off the table. States can negotiate their 
coexistence through the political process in Congress. Also, the 
Interstate Compact Clause in Article I, § 10 authorizes a state to 
enter an “Agreement or Compact with another State” given the 
consent of Congress.62 
Although their ends and means thus differ, horizontal 
federalism nevertheless overlaps with vertical federalism. The reason 
is that enablement of federal authority, together with disablement of 
state authority, is the major technique for restraining state power on a 
horizontal level. For example, the states lost their right to print their 
own money in 1789.63 
So, how precisely to define horizontal federalism? This 
doctrine comprises a diverse set of constitutional mechanisms for 
ameliorating the interstate conflicts or tensions that would inevitably 
result from union. The best way to convey horizontal federalism’s set 
of mechanisms is by giving additional examples. 
The Commerce Clause empowered the federal government in 
economic matters. Even in its unexercised or dormant condition, the 
Clause was read to knock the states out of the zone of regulating 
interstate commerce.64 This so-called Dormant Commerce Clause 
prohibits state discrimination against out-of-state goods and services. 
It has thereby headed off internal trade wars and created a common 
market for this country. 
In connection with authority to adjudicate, one sees another 
example of how horizontal federalism protects one state from 
another. Subject-matter jurisdictional provisions, such as diversity 
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a state has exceeded a limit on its power that exists because of its status as only one 
of fifty co-equal entities that must govern within limits created by the existence of 
the other forty-nine.”). 
 62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.  
 63. Id. 
 64. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 41, § 5.3, at 443-44. 
 Civil Procedure’s Five Big Ideas 81 
jurisdiction, comfort each state with the knowledge that its citizens 
can escape sister-state courts to a neutral federal forum. Removal 
statutes act in the same way. 
This adjudicatory example clarifies that horizontal federalism 
works not only on the state-to-state level but also protects sister-state 
citizens. States must treat out-of-state individuals equally and fairly. 
The anti-discrimination principle finds express statement in 
Article IV, § 2: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” In 
connection with authority to adjudicate one sees another example of 
how horizontal federalism protects the individual, namely, by federal 
enforcement of the procedural fairness principle through the Due 
Process Clause. 
The subject that most nicely exposes the workings of horizontal 
federalism is interstate territorial authority to adjudicate. The 
preceding topic’s introduction to interstate, or horizontal, choice of 
law smoothed the transition to study of territorial authority to 
adjudicate. The next topic will continue the theme of horizontal 
federalism in connection with full faith and credit for judgments. But 
here the study is of state-court territorial jurisdiction. 
B. Application to Authority to Adjudicate 
1. Evolution of Territorial Jurisdiction 
The states came into the Constitutional Convention as 
sovereigns. The Convention’s product left them sovereigns—except 
to the extent they surrendered sovereign rights in 1789 or by later 
constitutional amendments. Horizontal federalism embodies both 
these ideas of sovereignty and surrendered sovereignty. 
A full sovereign can do whatever it wants, having the raw force 
to adjudicate any dispute when, and how, it pleases, as well as the 
capability to enforce its adjudication on persons and things over 
which it eventually acquires physical control. The need for 
enforcement proves that territorial boundaries sometimes matter, but 
otherwise anything goes. True, international law has long envisaged 
some limit on that raw force, such as the requirement of an adequate 
connection between the judgment-rendering sovereign and the target 
of litigation. But the only force behind international law lay in 
82 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
authorizing a second sovereign’s refusal to give effect to a foreign 
judgment that had failed to observe international standards.65 
In phase one of the American experience, the states surrendered 
some of their sovereignty by agreeing to the Constitution. But it was 
by no means clear what the Constitution’s version of horizontal 
federalism intended as to the states’ territorial jurisdiction, a topic a 
good deal less prominent then than it is now. No constitutional 
clause treated that topic. Instead, the states agreed to a Full Faith and 
Credit Clause regarding judgments, and Congress soon passed an 
implementing statute on full faith and credit, but the Clause and 
statute were not very clear either.66 Perhaps states would treat sister-
state judgments in the manner of domestic judgments’ automatic 
recognition, or perhaps states would give them the scant regard 
owing foreign-nation judgments. In fact, the courts right after the 
Founding hit upon a compromise between those Federalist and Anti-
Federalist positions: States were to give full effect to sister-state 
judgments, but they retained the right to test them for satisfaction of 
the international-law standard for territorial jurisdiction (or rather the 
standard as interpreted by American courts in their home-grown 
power test).67 Thus, horizontal federalism developed a means for one 
state to check the jurisdictional overreaching by another state, that is, 
as a way to protect state sovereignty from impingement by a sister 
state. Exercise of this indirect control launched the doctrine of 
territorial jurisdiction on the road to its modern prominence. 
In phase two came the Civil War—along with the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868 fundamentally altering federalism. Ten years 
later, Pennoyer recognized the seismic shift.68 It began to move the 
focus of concern from state-to-state sovereignty toward the state-to-
person limits on state power to infringe personal rights. That move 
caused the Court to invoke the Substantive Due Process Clause.69 
The Court would use that Clause to assert federal protection for 
fundamental private rights, although in the coming laissez-faire era 
the Court would invoke those rights mainly to tell government what 
                                                     
 65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 482 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 66. See infra Part IV. 
 67. See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 
S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 260-61 (1990); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law 
Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 
169, 175-209 (2004). 
 68. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 719-20, 734-36 (1877). 
 69. See infra Section V.A. 
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it could not do. This switch in use from full faith and credit to 
substantive due process meant that, while previously a state was free 
to invoke international-law standards to deny effect to a sister-state 
judgment, now the affected person could make the second state treat 
the judgment as invalid or even stop the first proceeding in the 
rendering state. Henceforth, the second state’s checking of the 
rendering state’s jurisdiction came to mean applying the 
jurisdictional law that was applicable in the rendering state itself. 
In phase three came the New Deal—which jolted the 
Constitution with the realization that government action and inaction 
were not neutral. A decade later, International Shoe recognized the 
shift by starting the move from the power test toward a fairness test, 
still under the banner of the Due Process Clause.70 The Court acted in 
a social-welfare spirit to explore what government could do to 
protect the individual. It perceived that the location of litigation 
impacted the distribution of societal resources. It stepped in to site 
litigation appropriately. Ironically, however, subsequent cases ended 
up with the view that the fairness test supplements the power test 
rather than replaces it, a resolution that has worked to the advantage 
of pro-business interests. 
The complicated doctrine that resulted in cases like Shaffer,71 
and that prevails today by the cumulative testing for power and 
unreasonableness, sets the stage for arguing about the law of 
tomorrow. Perhaps we are moving to testing solely for fairness. The 
courts are still at work on defining the law of territorial jurisdiction. 
The lesson is that although the law of territorial jurisdiction is 
an important component of the nation’s horizontal federalism, this 
component has evolved a great deal over the course of the nation’s 
constitutional history. Studied apart from the constitutional structure, 
territorial jurisdiction is incomprehensible. With the proper 
background, however, the law in its current form actually makes 
sense: The federal suprasovereign arguably should ensure that states 
both observe the limits on their power and avoid treating individuals 
unreasonably. But no one should expect that this law has arrived at 
its destination and so will remain unchanged in the future. 
                                                     
 70. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 71. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
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2. Extension to International Jurisdiction 
Viewing territorial jurisdiction in the context of the 
constitutional structure makes international jurisdiction easier to 
understand too. The background again is that modern sovereigns are 
able to do whatever they wish to do, other than enforcing their 
judgments abroad. International law envisages some limit on that 
raw force, including a requirement of adequate connection between 
the sovereign and the target of the action. But all that international 
law can do is allow the second sovereign to refuse effect to a foreign-
nation judgment for failure to observe international standards. This is 
only an indirect control on territorial jurisdiction. In other words, the 
world today is in the pre-Constitution condition of clashing 
sovereigns. The situation is therefore one of horizontal relations 
rather than horizontal federalism.  
Looking back on America’s international experience, our 
courts at the time of the Founding were willing to abide by their view 
of international law’s constraint. That is, American courts abided by 
their power test when asserting their own jurisdiction. Before 
honoring foreign-nation judgments, American courts would test the 
rendering court’s jurisdiction by application of the power test. But, 
anyway, the only effect they gave to foreign-nation judgments was 
an evidential effect. The judgment would be admissible as sufficient 
or prima facie evidence, in the sense that a plaintiff seeking 
enforcement could introduce a foreign-nation judgment to show 
there was presumptively a judgment debt, but the defendant could 
then induce full and free reexamination of the merits of the claim to 
show no debt was owing.72 
The turning point was the decision in Hilton v. Guyot.73 By that 
1895 case, the U.S. Supreme Court shifted our approach to comity. 
Henceforth, based on policy-based deference rather than legal 
compulsion, the United States would choose in general to treat 
foreign-nation judgments as states treat sister-state judgments.74 The 
United States retained, however, the right to test for satisfaction of 
basic notions of U.S. due process. The Hilton regime is the U.S. law 
of today for international litigation. Note that it essentially resembles 
the pre-Civil War regime among U.S. states. 
                                                     
 72. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 608, at 
829-30 (8th ed. 1883). 
 73. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 74. Id. at 164-64.  
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The United States would like to induce equal treatment of U.S. 
judgments abroad. The much-discussed treaty possibilities would go 
even further.75 The present discussion reveals the proposed treaty as 
an attempt to bring the international regime into closer accord with 
the regime prevailing today in the United States under horizontal 
federalism. One idea would be for the world’s countries to agree on 
basic rules for territorial jurisdiction, as the United States achieved 
by imposition in 1868 of the Due Process Clause from above onto 
the states. The difficulty is in getting agreement on territorial 
jurisdiction despite the world’s disagreements over the themes of 
power and fairness. But once achieved, that agreement would allow 
the countries’ agreeing to respect each other’s judgments, as the 
United States achieved by the early imposition of full faith and credit 
provisions from above onto the states. 
The sobering note sounds upon one’s recalling the many years, 
conflicts, and confusions required to push the United States through 
its constitutional and jurisdictional history. The failure to reach a 
treaty so far becomes much more understandable. And the barriers to 
eventual agreement appear much higher. But they are not 
insurmountable. The European Union proved as much when its 
member countries agreed to their own scheme of horizontal 
federalism.76 
IV. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
The topic of former adjudication leads the student to consider 
the essence of the judicial branch. The judiciary’s output is in the 
form of a judgment, and res judicata is the doctrine that defines the 
judgment. For its effects, one looks to the notion of full faith and 
credit, which yields the benefits of a legally unified nation.77 
                                                     
 75. See CLERMONT, supra note 26, § 4.2(D)(3), at 326-30. 
 76. See Vanessa Abballe, Comparative Perspectives of the Articulation of 
Horizontal Interjurisdictional Relations in the United States and the European 
Union: The Federalization of Civil Justice, 15 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 
(2009). 
 77. See generally WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, THE 
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION (2005). 
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A. Constitutional Doctrine 
The rules for recognizing and enforcing a nondomestic 
judgment are in considerable part obligatory on American courts 
when that judgment comes from another American court. When the 
prior judgment was rendered by a state court and the second action is 
brought in a court of another state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
of Article IV, § 1 of the Federal Constitution applies: 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress 
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.78 
The First Congress passed implementing legislation, as the Act of 
May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122: 
That the acts of the legislatures of the several states shall be authenticated 
by having the seal of their respective states affixed thereto: That the 
records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state, shall be proved 
or admitted in any other court within the United States, by the attestation 
of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together 
with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, as the 
case may be, that the said attestation is in due form. And the said records 
and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith 
and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they 
have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said 
records are or shall be taken.79 
The Revisers of the Judicial Code in 1948, with the intent of making 
no substantive change, rephrased that statute as 28 U.S.C. § 1738: 
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the 
United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal 
of such State, Territory or Possession thereto. 
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, 
Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in 
other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by 
the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, 
together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is 
in proper form. 
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so 
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court 
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have 
                                                     
 78. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 79. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122. 
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by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from 
which they are taken.80 
Courts have read Constitution and statute together to require the 
second court to give the same binding effect to a valid and final 
judgment as the courts of the rendering state would give it. 
The doctrine’s history is instructive, even though it lies in 
scanty legislative history, in meager statutory law, and in meandering 
case law. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, according to contested 
recent scholarship, originally dealt only with the evidential effect of 
sister-state acts, records, and judicial proceedings.81 The Clause thus 
meant to ensure that a judgment would serve as evidence in another 
state, broadly leaving any other effect of the judgment to 
congressional legislation. The term “full” in the Clause meant, in the 
prevailing parlance, that the judgment would be admissible as 
sufficient or prima facie evidence; thus, a plaintiff seeking 
enforcement could introduce a valid and final sister-state judgment to 
show there was presumptively a judgment debt, but the defendant 
could then induce full and free reexamination of the merits of the 
claim to show no debt was owing; this approach accorded with the 
treatment then given to foreign-nation judgments. In short, the 
Clause’s intention was that congressional implementation of the 
constitutional provision would be necessary to impose a binding 
effect, as opposed to this merely evidential effect. 
Congress therefore has broad discretion as to the effects of 
sister-state acts, records, and judicial proceedings.82 Although it has 
not exercised its power often, it did so almost immediately, 
seemingly giving the states’ judgments conclusive effect by means of 
the last sentence in the 1790 statute.83 The Supreme Court so read the 
statute in 1813.84 Courts came to view the statute as requiring the 
same effect as the judgment had in the rendering state. 
                                                     
 80. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).  
 81. See David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1584, 1587-88 (2009). But see Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of 
Full Faith and Credit, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485, 487-88 (2013). 
 82. See Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A 
Role for Congress, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 89, 90. 
 83. See Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1201, 1231-40 (2009). 
 84. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813). Francis Scott Key, 
as counsel, contended plausibly that full faith and credit required only that the 
judgment be weighed along with the evidence, but the Court held that at least the 
implementing statute required giving the judgment a binding effect. Id. at 481-82, 
485. 
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Starting in the later 1800s, however, “intellectual slippage” as 
to the difference between the Clause and the statute led to a 
considerable power grab by the judiciary at the expense of legislative 
discretion.85 Without realizing what it was doing, the Court came to 
read the Full Faith and Credit Clause as itself dictating conclusive 
effect of judgments, leaving to the legislature a power to create 
exceptions and extensions.86 And that view prevails in the courts of 
today. 
This history helps to explain the coverage of the doctrine today. 
The Clause’s reference to “public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings” comprises judgments and all other state governmental 
records, including most notably the state’s statutory and decisional 
law.87 The sister state must give “Full Faith and Credit” in its courts 
and in all its other offices. 
The preceding paragraph does not mean, however, that all acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings enjoy the same treatment. By virtue 
of the history, courts must give judgments the same conclusive effect 
they have where rendered. This is a strong command. But the courts 
need only accept as evidence all those other records from another 
state; likewise, state offices other than courts must accept as 
evidence all those governmental records of another state. This is a 
weak command. 
The most important consequence of this formulation’s 
bifurcation is the lenient constraint from full faith and credit on 
choice of law. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal 
Constitution in a way that gives American courts a very free hand in 
choosing the governing law and, in particular, in choosing to apply 
their own law to nonlocal events.88 Courts continue to recognize this 
basic distinction between respect for judgments and choice of law: a 
strong command as to the former and a weak one as to the latter.89
                                                     
85. Engdahl, supra note 81, at 1588-89. 
86. See, e.g., Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 462, 465 
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There is no general obligation to give conclusive effect to 
nondomestic nonjudgments.90 In describing the doctrine’s coverage, 
then, I should not skip over the threshold question of what 
“judgments” means.91 The word includes court judgments, of course. 
It does not include arbitration awards, unless a court has 
confirmed the award. That is, neither the Clause nor the statute 
compels the forum court to respect a bare arbitral decision. As to 
administrative agency adjudications, other than those upheld via a 
court judgment, they are outside the language of § 1738, which 
reaches only “court” judgments.92 One could still argue that 
administrative adjudications fall within the broader language of the 
constitutional Clause.93 Or one could take the view that they, not 
being “judicial proceedings,” do not come within the Clause’s 
command concerning judgments.94 Unfortunately, the Court’s messy 
cases on point leave the matter open: It is possible that the Clause 
reaches some quasi-judicial proceedings of court-like administrative 
tribunals.95
Nevertheless, judicially unconfirmed arbitration awards and 
judicially unreviewed administrative determinations often get respect 
in the courts of a different jurisdiction.96 Recall that when full faith 
and credit does not compel recognition or enforcement, the second 
court can, unless prohibited by some federal statute, still choose as a 
matter of comity to give the same effect to a valid and final judgment 
as the rendering state would.97 Such recognition and enforcement 
flow usually from the second sovereign’s conflict of laws doctrine.98
The special interest here, however, is the constitutional 
doctrine’s demand for judicial recognition and enforcement of 
                                                     
90. Cf. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
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judgments. It is indeed a strong demand. Let us consider separately 
recognition and enforcement. 
A state court will recognize, or in other words give effect under 
the doctrine of res judicata to, a sister-state judgment that is valid and 
final. When the second court faces the question of whether the prior 
judgment is valid and final, it should apply the law of the sister state 
(which of course is subject to any applicable external restraints, such 
as due process and other federal provisions imposed on and 
becoming part of the sister-state’s law).99 When the second court 
faces a question of the extent or reach of res judicata based on the 
prior judgment, it should apply the res judicata law that the rendering 
court would apply (including any applicable external restraints).100 
The doctrine also requires enforcement of a judgment entitled 
to recognition. A local sheriff will not enforce a judgment issued by 
another sovereign, and a local judge cannot directly enforce a 
judgment that is not a matter of record in that jurisdiction. Instead, 
the second sovereign will provide some other enforcement procedure 
that converts the nondomestic judgment into a domestic record.101 
With respect to the method of enforcement, the second court applies 
its own law, subject to the proviso that the method should not be so 
complex or expensive as to burden unduly the enforcement of 
nondomestic judgments.102 A usual method of enforcement of 
nondomestic judgments is for the plaintiff to initiate in the second 
jurisdiction an action upon the prior judgment and thus obtain a 
regularly enforceable domestic judgment.103 
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the literal import of Clause 
and statute, ways to escape the obligation to recognize and enforce. 
For example, the forum court can allow a challenge to the 
jurisdiction of the rendering court. There are also narrow exceptions 
                                                     
 99. See id. § 92, at 272-73, § 93, at 278, § 107, at 320; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481(1), at 581, § 482, 
at 604 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
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(AM. LAW INST. 1971) (amended 1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
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 102. See id. at 328 (holding “that the statute of limitations of Georgia can be 
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South Carolina”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 99-102, at 303-
07 (AM. LAW INST. 1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 481(2), at 594 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 100 cmt. b, at 305 
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where some or all of the dictates of full faith and credit do not apply, 
such as where recognition or enforcement would so grossly and 
improperly interfere with the second state’s important interests as to 
create a national interest against such recognition or enforcement. 
One must distinguish this national interest against recognition or 
enforcement from the second state’s local distaste for the nature of 
the underlying claim. That is, there is no general exception based on 
the second state’s public policy,104 and indeed specific examples of a 
national interest recognized by the courts are rare.105 Yet the Clause 
expressly authorizes congressional exceptions.106 Thus, in narrow 
circumstances grounded on strong federal substantive or procedural 
policies, federal law may provide against (or conceivably may 
augment by statute) recognition or enforcement. 
One question that expresses itself more intensely than when 
one first read about these rules is whether a state court, when within 
the Clause and the statute, can go beyond giving the same effect and 
instead give more effect than the rendering state would give to its 
own judgments. For example, could the forum state apply its own, 
more expansive res judicata law to a sister-state’s judgment? 
Certainly, the Clause and statute require F-2 to accord to a 
valid and final F-1 judgment “at least the res judicata effect” that it 
has in F-1.107 No one contends that F-2 can give less effect to an F-1 
judgment than it has in F-1. But whether F-2 can, if its policy 
permits, give more effect to an F-1 judgment than it has in F-1 is a 
question that has not yet received a definitive answer. Some have 
suggested that F-2 could do so.108 But most authorities have asserted, 
to the contrary, that recognition of a judgment for full faith and credit 
                                                     
 104. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998). Thus, the fact 
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purposes means giving the judgment “the same effect that it has in 
the state where it was rendered.”109 
On the one hand, the argument in favor of giving more effect 
runs like this. Assume that the F-1 judgment is valid and final, that 
the F-1 res judicata rule in the situation under discussion would 
permit relitigation of the claim or issue, that the F-2 rule would not 
permit relitigation, and that the F-2 res judicata rule does not exceed 
due process or other such constitutional limitations when applied to 
F-2 judgments. If F-2 has a significant connection to the parties or to 
the events involved in the F-1 litigation, and if the relitigation is to 
take place in F-2’s court, F-2 is presumably free to conduct the 
litigation in accordance with its applicable substantive as well as 
procedural law. If F-2 has sufficient connection with the litigation to 
permit the application of its substantive law to the claims or issues 
without violating the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, it would seem to have sufficient connection to apply its res 
judicata law to claims or issues relevant in the F-2 action that were 
previously litigated in F-1. Thus, application of F-2’s broader 
preclusion rules is arguably permissible. And, of course, F-2 has 
interests in avoiding the burden of relitigation. 
On the other hand, if F-2 accords claim preclusion or issue 
preclusion effects to the F-1 judgment, the result will be a new 
judgment that will then be entitled to full faith and credit, and hence 
res judicata effects, in every other state—even in F-1. The effect of 
F-2’s last-in-time application of its own broader res judicata 
standards could significantly change the future effects of the F-1 
adjudication.110 For instance, if F-2 held that the F-1 judgment was a 
bar to a later suit on the claim, the F-2 judgment would then prevent 
relitigation of the claim even in F-1, under whose rules the first 
judgment had not been a bar. Similar permanent effects can result for 
issues that had not been regarded as conclusively determined under 
the res judicata rules of F-1, if F-2’s judgment precludes relitigation 
of the issues under F-2’s rules. These oddities necessarily result from 
the full-faith-and-credit fact that F-1 does not have the symmetrical 
                                                     
 109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS intro. note to ch. 5, topic 
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 110. See Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 454-55 (1928) (allowing suit 
back in F-1 on F-2’s judgment rendered in an action upon an F-1 judgment, even 
though F-1’s original judgment was unenforceable). 
 Civil Procedure’s Five Big Ideas 93 
power to give F-2’s judgment less effect than it has in F-2. So, F-2’s 
application of its own broader res judicata law has an unavoidable 
impact on F-1. Surely, F-1 has significant substantive and procedural 
interests in specifying the effects of its own judgments. Arguably, 
then, F-2’s interest in avoiding relitigation is insufficient to justify 
such an impingement on F-1’s interests. 
The outcome is not a toss-up, however, because more is at 
stake than balancing the two states’ interests. The way to resolve this 
question is to return to the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. It meant to give us the benefits of a judicially unified nation. 
A judgment of F-1 should mean the same thing everywhere within 
the nation, regardless of whether a person manages to sue 
subsequently in a broad or narrow res judicata state. It should further 
be noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1738, substantially similar to the statute 
passed in 1790 to implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
provides for the effect to be the “same” as the judgment has in the 
court from which it is taken.111 
Additionally, fairness argues that the parties litigating in F-1 
should know then what is at stake and what any judgment will mean 
anywhere in the nation.112 A person should know the detrimental 
effect of a potential judgment. Moreover, the effect should not 
change with the particular F-2 in which the opponent later chooses, 
perhaps surprisingly, to invoke it. 
Even more basically, res judicata is the law that specifies what 
a judgment decides and what it does not decide, the law that defines 
the boundaries of the judgment. What the judgment does not decide 
is just as important as what it decides. The boundaries are an intrinsic 
part of the judgment. To respect a judgment requires respecting its 
boundaries. For F-2 to give more effect to the content of F-1’s 
judgment than F-1 would give—rather than the same effect—
necessarily implies that F-2 is giving less effect to the judgment’s 
boundaries. In short, this whole question disappears with the 
realization that no meaningful distinction exists between more and 
less effect. Consequently, full faith and credit must require the 
second court to give the same effect to the judgment’s content and its 
boundaries as would the rendering state. 
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B. Application to Former Adjudication 
1. Meaning of Res Judicata Within the Same Jurisdiction  
Before turning to the direct implications for civil procedure of 
the constitutional doctrine, one should think about that simple but 
elusive lesson coming indirectly from study of full faith and credit: 
Res judicata is nothing more or less than the body of law that defines 
a “judgment.” After all, a judgment is not merely a concrete 
embodiment of a court decision. By necessity, a judgment decides 
certain things and does not decide other things. Res judicata 
performs the job of delineating that real content of a judgment, by 
specifying the effects and noneffects of the decision. 
Res judicata dictates whether decided matters are subject to 
reopening, as well as which actually undecided matters nevertheless 
fall within the bounds of a judgment and so receive treatment as if 
decided. It also dictates what lies outside the boundaries of the 
judgment. Although res judicata law may appear to be a jumble of 
arcane rules, it essentially has this straightforward but profound 
mission of defining the scope of a prior adjudication. It is good to 
remember that res judicata literally means the thing, or matter, 
adjudged. 
Therefore, this doctrine is of universal importance both 
practical and systemic. It proves critical in interpreting any 
judgment. Accordingly, res judicata is a major and critical topic in 
the basic law-school course on civil procedure. 
Moreover, res judicata is the doctrine that defines the output of 
the judicial branch. Unlike the legislature or the administration, 
which can act on all citizens, the court acts with respect to certain 
matters concerning only the parties before it and a very limited set of 
others. Strangers have their right to a day in court. This feature helps 
to give the judicial branch its distinctive nature: individualized 
application of the substantive law before a neutral decisionmaker in 
accordance with predetermined procedures, and with limited future 
effects but with finality as to those effects. 
Let’s get more specific: 
(1) Because a judgment, as delineated by res judicata law, is 
the primary objective of most adjudicative proceedings, a knowing 
eye trained on res judicata will greatly affect the litigant’s 
implementation of procedure, both way before and way after 
judgment. From composing pleadings in the initial lawsuit to settling 
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or otherwise ending that case and then to attacking the judgment in a 
second lawsuit, the litigant must bear res judicata in mind. 
(2) Res judicata shores up separation of powers by setting the 
boundaries on the output of the judicial branch of government. It is 
the law that restrains the applicability of judicial decisions to 
nonparties and the retroactivity of later legal change to already 
adjudicated matters. Because res judicata so determines how a 
judgment differs from legislation and administration, the doctrine is 
of basic importance in understanding the governmental system. 
(3) At a more profound level, res judicata does much more. It is 
essential to judicial operation, to the orderly working of the judicial 
branch. If disputants could just reopen their adjudicated disputes, 
there would be no end to the case, nor any beginning of judicial 
authority. Finality is not just an efficient policy, it is a necessary 
condition for the existence of a judiciary. 
Given that res judicata plays a key role in procedure, separation 
of powers, and judicial operation, it is naturally a difficult subject. 
Moreover, like any policy, it has its costs as well as its benefits. As 
to obvious costs, one readily perceives that litigating about whether 
to relitigate is expensive, and some applications of the doctrine do 
seem outrageously unfair. Often, frustrated students and other 
victims of res judicata, after realizing its difficulties and lamenting 
its costs, ask whether we would be better off without res judicata. 
Yet they should acknowledge that this question is nonsensical in 
itself. Our legal system could not exist without res judicata. Sure, the 
system could lop off some extensions and some details of res 
judicata. But the essence of res judicata—its mission of giving an 
adjudication basic binding effects—is nonoptional. A version of it 
must apply to every judgment ever rendered.  
This realization informs all sorts of comparative and historical 
inquiries. Each legal system generates a res judicata law. “The 
doctrine of res judicata is a principle of universal jurisprudence 
forming part of the legal systems of all civilized nations.”113 The 
basic message of res judicata is that at some point the pursuit of truth 
must and should cease: Justice demands that there be an end to 
litigation. In order for any nascent judicial system to operate, a 
decision must have at least some minimal bindingness. 
Consequently, around the world, every legal system, from its 
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beginnings, has generated a common core of res judicata law to 
make adjudications final. 
2. Treatment of Judgments from Other Jurisdictions 
As already suggested, the American res judicata rules are 
obligatory on this country’s courts when the judgment comes from 
another American court. The Framers perceived the need for 
certainty and uniformity as to the treatment of state judgments, and 
therefore required respectful treatment via constitutional clause. That 
command helps us to realize the benefits of a unified nation: 
The full faith and credit clause is one of the foundation stones upon 
which our federal system is constructed. Its obvious purpose is to make 
available some of the benefits of a centralized nation by altering “the 
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties . . . and to 
make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy 
upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right. . . .”114 
Moreover, the individual’s rights embodied in the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause are of obvious importance to the citizens of a 
federation: 
It was placed foremost among those measures [such as the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause] which would guard the new political and economic 
union against the disintegrating influence of provincialism in 
jurisprudence, but without aggrandizement of federal power at the expense 
of the states.115  
Thus, a judgment for $20 million from a Massachusetts court should 
be worth that same amount in California, for reasons of fairness as 
well as for political and economic reasons. 
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The very same reasons are at play in the interjurisdictional 
contexts other than a state court’s treatment of a sister-state 
judgment. The basic approach to all judgments therefore is 
retroverse, in the sense of turning backward to look at the rendering 
court’s view of its own judgment. The second court lets the first 
court’s law decide what it conclusively adjudicated.116 
Again, the more specific implications merit consideration: 
(1) Res judicata implies at least some respect for prior 
adjudication across legal systems linked by federalism, vertical as 
well as horizontal. Without such respect, the more powerful courts 
would inevitably extinguish their competitors. If disputants could 
reopen their disputes in the superior court, they would come to skip 
over the inferior court. The royal courts in England prevailed over 
the local courts in part because of their willingness to allow litigation 
anew.117 Contrariwise, the continued thriving of federal and state 
courts in the United States is owing to a healthy doctrine of res 
judicata. 
(2) On the level of international law, res judicata might not be 
absolutely necessary. The law of the jungle might work, because 
each nation has a zone of autonomous operation. But especially 
today, with ever-increasing globalization, a sensible international 
order requires an international law on the application of res judicata. 
The United States should and does respect most of the judgments of 
France, and vice versa one would hope. 
(3) Any steps toward establishing any such regime of full faith 
and credit for nondomestic judgments depends on providing 
assurance that the rendering court’s legal system is worthy of 
respect. A guarantee of due process in the rendering court would do 
the trick. 
Within the American system, the applicability of the Due 
Process Clause now performs the necessary work of ensuring 
respect-worthy judgments. With peace of mind, an American F-2 can 
give full faith and credit to an American F-1’s judgment, because F-2 
knows that the parties could ensure that F-1 delivered due process, 
both substantively and procedurally: F-1 did not overreach in 
exercising territorial jurisdiction, and F-1 employed fundamentally 
                                                     
 116. See RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: 
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 4, at 10-11 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 
Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 
70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 70-76 (1984). 
 117. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 22-27 
(4th ed. 2002). 
98 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
fair procedures—otherwise, the U.S. Supreme Court would have 
been empowered to step in. 
On the international stage, things are trickier. There might be 
no supreme court, or there might be no due process clause that is 
applicable internationally. So comity is the best approach we can 
follow currently. To establish a more demanding system of respect 
for judgments, there would have to be agreement on respect-worthy 
proceedings: at least a treaty mechanism to restrict exorbitant 
jurisdiction, if not also to create some assurance of fundamental 
fairness. 
The principal European countries appear to have taken such 
steps on the treatment of some foreign judgments. The European 
Union concluded a treaty that is now an EU regulation called the 
Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.118 By it, 
the member states agreed to provide virtually automatic recognition 
and enforcement of the judgments of the other member states. This 
provision was like the full faith and credit provisions in the United 
States. In order to make this agreement acceptable, the Convention 
was a “double convention” that also defined the bases of territorial 
jurisdiction.119 The agreement on jurisdiction worked as the due 
process provisions do in the United States. The European member 
states could give respect to the others’ judgments because they knew 
that the Convention restricted the others to appropriately limited 
jurisdictional reach. Today, there is in effect a supreme court too. 
The European Court of Justice, in Luxembourg, exercises 
supranational authority, overseeing the national courts, to decide 
questions under the Brussels Regulation.120 All this makes the current 
times exciting in Europe, as the ECJ actively works out the details, 
much as the Marshall Court united the American judicial systems 
two centuries ago. 
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Americans, however, are being whipsawed by the European 
approach. Not only are they still subject (in theory) to the far-
reaching jurisdiction of European courts and the wide recognition 
and enforceability of the resulting European judgments, but also U.S. 
judgments tend (in practice) to receive short shrift in European 
courts. The overall international situation, as exacerbated by the 
Brussels Regulation, is untenable in the long run for the United 
States. Therefore, in 1992 the United States initiated a push to 
conclude a worldwide convention on respect for judgments, acting 
through the Hague Conference on Private International Law.121 
Pragmatically speaking, jurisdiction is the doctrine that would serve 
almost alone in ensuring adjudicative restraint. Drafting and agreeing 
to such a multilateral convention on jurisdiction and judgments could 
yield great returns for the United States. But so far the negotiators 
have not had great success in hammering out a worldwide 
understanding on due process and full faith and credit.122 
V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
The study of complex litigation brings us back partway to 
procedure in the strict sense of the mechanics of the civil process. 
The big idea here concerns procedures that use the justification of 
adequate representation to extend the binding effects of a judgment 
to persons largely playing the role of nonparties. Although 
procedural law puts severe limits on such extension, the Constitution 
puts an absolute but distant limit on how far law can extend the 
binding effects. To perceive that outer limit, the focus must shift to 
procedural due process.123 
A. Constitutional Doctrine 
In the Constitution, due process of law is guaranteed by the 
Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal government, and by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to state governments. These 
guarantees say that the federal and state governments cannot deprive 
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any person “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”124 
The sparsely worded Due Process Clauses have been 
interpreted to contain substantive as well as procedural components. 
Substantive due process protects from governmental infringement 
the fundamental rights “implicit in ordered liberty,” including those 
such as privacy that are not covered by some other constitutional 
provision like the Equal Protection Clause. Procedural due process 
embodies the notion of “fundamental fairness.” Substantive due 
process limits what the government can do, while procedural due 
process establishes a floor for how it must proceed when depriving 
someone of life, liberty, or property.125 
Substantive due process has a sorry history of judicial 
overstepping that has made it controversial and leaves it rather 
restricted today. The most prominent appearance of substantive due 
process in connection with civil procedure is the constitutional law 
of territorial jurisdiction. Much of that law about the limits on a 
state’s adjudicating with respect to out-of-staters rests on the 
substantive part of the Due Process Clause. Procedural due process is 
much more prominent in civil procedure because it aims to assure a 
basically fair procedure when the government acts. For example, to 
authorize governmental action significantly impairing a person’s 
protected interest, procedural due process normally requires adequate 
notification and the opportunity to be heard at proceedings before a 
neutral decisionmaker.126 
Another way to categorize rights is to distinguish those that are 
more or less absolute as a formal matter from those that are subject 
to balancing against countervailing considerations including direct 
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costs.127 Most rights protected by substantive due process tend to be 
spoken of as absolute rights, ones that trump most other 
considerations.128 But much of the protection of procedural due 
process is definitely subject to being balanced away.129 
The judicial approach to procedural due process is to ascertain 
first that an interest in life, liberty, or property is at stake. More than 
mere expectations or other unprotected interests must be at stake to 
trigger a right to any process at all.130 Then, if the interest is a 
protected one, the court must determine what process is due. The 
way to answer this second question is to ask if the requested 
safeguard is essential to fairness, all things considered. The result is a 
constitutional test that is vague, but at least realistic and reasonable. 
In the second step of deciding whether to require any other 
procedural safeguard—say, defining exactly what kind of hearing the 
Constitution requires in a lawsuit—the Supreme Court has come to 
use a cost-benefit analysis that accommodates the competing 
concerns.131 The Court dictates consideration of (1) the value, or 
importance, of the interest at stake; (2) the probability of an 
erroneous deprivation if the procedural safeguard in question is not 
provided; and (3) the cost of, or the burden imposed by, that 
safeguard. Upon combining and balancing those three concerns, 
good policy would require the safeguard when the risk of harm 
without the safeguard exceeds the safeguard’s cost. 
However, I am speaking here of a constitutional requirement. 
The Due Process Clauses dictate the minimally fair process that the 
government must provide when impairing a person’s property or 
liberty interest. By contrast, the lawmaking architects build a law of 
civil procedure that delivers much more “good” than mere due 
process. They seek thereby to achieve optimal policies and rules 
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above the constitutional floor. The Constitution requires no more 
than a minimum. Thus, the risk of harm would have to considerably 
exceed the cost before amounting to a constitutional violation, rather 
than merely bad policy. Such deference seems especially appropriate 
in this setting where courts are weighing the largely unmeasurable 
and incommensurable in order to second-guess the legislature or its 
delegatee. Therefore, procedural due process will require the 
safeguard only when the risk of harm without the safeguard 
substantially exceeds the safeguard’s cost.  
An economist would rephrase the Court’s approach by 
comparing the expected error cost (the product of the probability of 
error without the safeguard, Pe, times the cost of error if it occurs, 
Ce) with the direct cost of the government’s providing the safeguard, 
Cd. To sum up, procedural due process requires the safeguard if and 
only if: 
 
Pe Ce  >>  Cd  
 
This economic approach is less opaque and more rigorous than 
the Court’s. Also, the economic approach opens the door to defining 
costs more inclusively, so that process-based concerns, such as 
fostering participation by parties to serve the ultimate goal of process 
legitimacy, can count. Still, both approaches remain controversial. 
Trying to define “due process” requires some hubris, and all the 
more so to put it in terms of costs and benefits. 
Nonetheless, employing a balancing test does not imply that 
every procedural due process question ends up being addressed ad 
hoc on a case-by-case basis. By balancing, prior cases could have 
generated a “rule” that applies in a particular context across a range 
of cases. For example, there is a rule of procedural due process 
against constructive notice of a lawsuit to the parties, so that mailed 
notice of a hearing must be sent to anyone significantly affected 
whose identity and whereabouts are reasonably knowable.132 
B. Application to Complex Litigation 
1. Privity 
The conclusory label of privy describes people who were 
nonparties to an action but who in certain circumstances are 
nevertheless subjected to generally the same rules of res judicata as 
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are the former parties.133 Procedural due process is concerned with 
the substance of fundamental fairness: the full and fair day in court. 
Does that mean that due process forbids binding by judgment 
persons other than parties? 
The answer, of course, is no. Due process is not violated 
merely because a nonparty is held bound. Actually, such preclusion 
is common. For instance, a beneficiary may be bound on issues 
litigated by the trustee or executor.134 Or, once an issue relating to an 
interest in real property has been fully litigated between the title 
owner and another party, the issue is settled against later purchasers 
or devisees as well.135 Thus, any constitutionally required opportunity 
to be heard may come via devices other than the formal joinder of 
every person to be affected by the judgment, now or forever. 
The way to explain the reality of nonparty preclusion passes 
first through the recognition that the question is not one of 
substantive due process, whereby the claim to a day in court or to 
litigant autonomy could morph into an absolute right. Only a much 
more serious inroad than nonparty preclusion would raise a concern 
of substantive due process. Instead, the question is a matter of 
procedural due process, which makes the appropriate approach a 
balancing test. Taking the whole range of outcome-based and 
process-based interests into account, that test protects an opportunity 
to be heard as an essential safeguard of adjudicatory procedure, but 
not the opportunity to be heard in person. The opportunity can come 
through representation by a party, if that task is performed 
adequately well.136 
Another way to phrase the test of procedural due process is that 
it will allow binding of nonparties unless the costs substantially 
outweigh the benefits. This balance has worked out in this context to 
generate the “rule” that due process guarantees only a full and fair 
day in court enjoyed in person or through a decent representative.  
Accordingly, nonparty preclusion therefore does not 
contravene the Constitution when some sort of representational 
relationship existed between a former party and the nonparty. After 
all, the demands of due process are loose enough to allow the 
legislature and administrators to bind people and their property, 
when those people have received representation only in a weak 
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sense. Analogously, a court’s judgment would be constitutionally 
capable of binding, among others, all similarly situated persons 
whose interests received “adequate representation,” binding them not 
only through the flexible doctrine of stare decisis as it already does 
but also through the strictures of res judicata as it could. 
True, many judges and commentators utter broad statements to 
the effect that due process forbids binding nonparties. The more 
careful among them admit that their statement is subject to 
exceptions. My contrary suggestion is that the exceptions prove that 
due process commands no such thing. 
In sum, all that due process guarantees is a full and fair day in 
court enjoyed in person or through an adequate representative. 
Without that qualification, the right to a “day in court” is but a 
misleading slogan.137 With that qualification, it becomes apparent 
that due process would allow binding many more nonparties than 
most persons assume. 
Instead, it is subconstitutional law that normally requires a day 
in court before binding nonparties, thereby creating the illusion of 
due process’s day-in-court rule. Society has indeed chosen, as 
expressed in its res judicata law, to bind far fewer nonparties by 
judgment than it constitutionally could. Mere representation of the 
nonparty’s interests, however adequate, does not suffice for the 
subconstitutional lawmakers. It is their restraint that helps sharply to 
distinguish adjudication from the rest of governmental 
decisionmaking and to preserve its distinctive nature. 
So the task undertaken by the maker of subconstitutional law is 
to specify which nonparties to consider privies for purposes of res 
judicata. To induce that specification, some substantial reasons in 
policy must exist to bind a nonparty, and those reasons must 
outweigh the social costs of binding a nonparty.  
Then, for the various kinds of nonparties who thereby become 
potential candidates for binding, the law tries to draw a set of clear, 
simple, and rigid rules that together approximate that balancing of 
benefits and costs.138 The constitutional test turns on the adequacy of 
the former party’s representation of the nonparty, calibrated in a way 
appropriate to the adjudicatory context of individualized application 
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of the substantive law, and so it will remain a vague standard. But we 
can avoid that vagueness if the subconstitutional rules draw the line 
above the constitutional floor and try to do so clearly. 
The resulting res judicata law binds only those nonparties 
rather closely related to the representative party.139 There must be 
representation plus something else. That something might be a 
special procedural relationship ensuring alignment and protection of 
interests (or some sort of affirmative conduct signifying consent to 
representation) or a sufficient substantive relationship implying at 
least some sort of representational role. Worth noting yet again is 
that this current law represents how far we as a society have chosen 
to go, not how far we could go.140 
2. Class Action 
Privies include persons who were actually represented in the 
litigation by a party, thus including class-action members represented 
by their class representative pursuant to the pertinent procedural rule, 
be it Federal Rule 23 or a state provision.141 Thus, at the back end, res 
judicata is the law that gives binding effect to valid class-action 
judgments.142 Similar considerations govern the front end, affecting 
how the Constitution and the lawmakers control the joinder device 
itself. The class-action device can pursue society’s efficiency and 
substantive goals consistently with the fairness notion of having 
one’s day in court, as long as the essential due process requirement 
of adequate representation is met. For constitutional adequacy in the 
class-action context, the represented person need only have been in 
actual agreement, generally although not necessarily as to all details, 
with the objectives on the merits of some party, who vigorously and 
competently pursued those objectives consciously as a 
representative.143 Indeed, because the adequacy standard will vary 
with the particular context, it might demand less in the cohesive 
                                                     
 139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 39-63 (AM. LAW INST. 
1982). 
 140. See Tice v. Am. Airlines, 162 F.3d 966, 971-73 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that adequate representation is not enough to constitute privity). 
 141. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
 142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 41-42 (AM. LAW. INST. 
1982). 
 143. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); see also Martin v. Wilks, 
490 U.S. 755, 758 (1989); Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 800-01 (1996).  
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actions fitting within Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) than in the merely efficient 
class actions under Rule 23(b)(3).144 
Nonetheless, society has chosen, as expressed in its class-action 
provisions, not to go nearly as far in binding nonparties by judgment 
than it constitutionally could. That is, society tolerates only certain 
class actions. The helpful image here is of a due process hurdle that 
is quite low. Above it, in Rule 23(a) and (b), the rulemakers have 
built a screen for the federal courts that allows through only a select 
set of cases that satisfy society’s policy desires. That is, Rule 23 and 
its related case law attempt to create a pragmatic screening device, 
which lets through all the cases most clearly appropriate for class-
action treatment—those cases that generously realize the goal of 
efficiency or the rulemakers’ rather limited substantive goals and that 
also amply satisfy fairness concerns—but only those cases. 
First, the law goes further than procedural due process, trying 
to comfortably ensure adequacy of representation at the outset of a 
class action by the scrutiny of a demanding class-certification 
process under Rule 23. Second, society has chosen to allow class 
actions to include only those designated nonparties who are related 
to the representative party in certain ways: The extra relationship 
required by Rule 23 is either that the absentees share common and 
thus aligned substantive interests with their representatives or that 
the former somehow consented to representation by the latter. Third, 
Rule 23 also imposes other management limits and protections to 
alleviate the obvious dangers of overwhelming the court and the 
parties and of disadvantaging the absent class members. This current 
law so represents how far we as a society have chosen to go, not how 
far we could go. 
The front end and the back end interconnect. When the class-
action judgment is invoked in subsequent litigation as res judicata, it 
is subject to attack on the usual limited grounds of jurisdiction and 
the like. But an absent class member should also be able to attack its 
binding effect on him by raising the constitutional question of 
inadequate representation of his interests. Although the absentee 
should not be able to collaterally attack on the ground of erroneous 
class-certification in violation of Rule 23, the ground of 
constitutionally inadequate representation falls literally under the 
heading of procedural due process as a permissible ground for attack, 
                                                     
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)-(3). 
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as well as within the spirit of later undoing fundamental defects in 
fairness but only those defects.145 
The lesson here is that although procedural due process may 
demand less than many people assume, it still may demand more 
than some would wish. Many pressures push toward aggregate 
treatment of today’s massive cases.146 But due process does, and 
should, put a limit on how far the would-be reformers can go in their 
pursuit of efficient disposition.147 
CONCLUSION 
If the teacher puts these big ideas together, the student will 
understand the legal system and also the law of civil procedure. 
Conveying a vision of a procedural architecture erected within the 
constitutional structure can serve as an exceedingly effective 
organizational theme for the subject. Without that vision, a 
prominent place for civil procedure in the law-school curriculum is 
hard to justify. 
My focus on the law of, and the course in, civil procedure may 
have sounded awfully parochial. It was the United States this, and 
the United States that, when I tried to show how five big ideas, 
which relate to one another as shown in the following diagram, 
underlie the field. But those five ideas are not unique to the United 
States. They in fact address near-universal concerns, which work out 
                                                     
 145. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003) (4–4 
decision) (affirming Second Circuit); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72-73 (5th 
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similarly in most legal systems. I try to suggest this fact by adding 
the corresponding terminology to the diagram that is in more 
common usage in other countries. Therefore, I think, my 
championing of a prominent place and unifying theme for civil 
procedure applies to law-school curricula near and far. 
 
 
 
